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THE WIND PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT AND
THE CASE FOR ENDING ALL ENERGY
SUBSIDIES
NICOLAS LORIS†
In a New York Times article entitled “A New Era for Windmill
Power,” journalist Matthew Wald writes,
A new generation of windmills that Don Quixote could never tilt
at is ready to take its place as an economical and important source
of the nation’s energy.
Because of striking improvements in technology, the commercial
use of these windmills, or wind turbines as the builders call them,
has shown that in addition to being pollution free, they can now
1
compete with fossil fuels in the cost of producing electricity.

Although Wald’s article reads like it could be found in this
morning’s New York Times, it was actually written in 1992—the same
year Congress passed and President George Bush Sr. signed into law
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which provided a renewable-energyproduction tax credit, which has largely benefited wind companies
and is now more commonly known as the wind production tax credit
2
3
(wind PTC). The wind PTC was set to expire on December 31, 2012,
but was extended as part of the negotiations to avoid a combination
4
of tax increases and government spending cuts.
The discussion over the wind PTC extension serves as a useful
microcosm of the debate over energy subsidies in general. Proponents
of the wind PTC and other energy subsidies argue that government
support is essential to spur innovation, compensate for decades of
† Nicolas Loris, an economist, focuses on energy, environmental and regulatory issues as
the Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The author would like to
thank Katie Tubb, Romina Boccia, David Kreutzer, Jack Spencer, and Duncan Goodwyn for
helpful suggestions and conversation.
1. Matthew L. Wald, A New Era for Wind Power, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 8, 1992, at C2,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/08/business/a-new-era-for-windmillpower.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
2. Renewable Energy Production Incentive, Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §
13317a (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13317 (West 2005)).
3. Producers that built windmills in 2012 would have continued to receive the subsidy
until 2022 because a producer is eligible to receive the subsidy for ten years after installation.
4. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, 126 Stat. at 2314, § 407.
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conventional-fuel subsidies, compete with other nations, prepare for
replacement of fossil fuel resources we are rapidly exhausting, and
5
reduce global warming. Advocates argue that if the subsidy is not
6
extended, the industry will atrophy and jobs would be lost.
Opponents respond that extending the wind PTC will not save
the planet, replace conventional fuels, or lead America to energy
independence. Instead, opponents argue that an extension of the
wind PTC will perpetuate subsidization in the American energy
sector and encourage technological stagnation by shifting resources
7
away from productive use. This Article argues that Congress and the
administration should work to remove all subsidies for all energy
sources to transform our energy economy into a competitive, marketoriented system.
I. WHAT ARE SUBSIDIES?
The general economic rule of thumb is that if you want less of
something, tax it, and if you want more of something, subsidize it.
Subsidies come in many shapes and sizes and are thus often difficult
to define comprehensively. Direct spending, targeted tax credits, loan
guarantees, production mandates, and policies that artificially lower
the risk of an activity are all part of the energy-subsidy world.
However, this is certainly not an all-encompassing list. The definition
of a subsidy as a direct transfer of money to a group or industry is
underinclusive.
While this Article will mostly examine one type of subsidy—the
wind PTC—it will use the following broader definition of subsidy:
Using the political process to support the production or consumption
of one good over another.
II. WHY SUBSIDIES ARE BAD ECONOMIC POLICY
Subsidies are bad economic policy because they misallocate
resources and reward political connectedness as opposed to sound
economic ideas. In general, there are two types of companies that

5. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, THE AMERICAN WIND INDUSTRY URGES CONGRESS TO
TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO PASS AN EXTENSION OF THE PTC (2012), available at
http://www.awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
6. Id.
7. DAVID E. DISMUKES, REMOVING BIG WIND’S “TRAINING WHEELS”: THE CASE FOR
ENDING THE FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 5–6 (2012), available at
http://www.americanenergyalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Dismukes-Removing-BigWinds-Training-Wheels.pdf.
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receive subsidies. First, there are companies that receive subsidies
because their technologies need help from the government and
cannot compete economically without taxpayer support. Second,
there are companies that would, and often do, receive investment
from the private sector because their technology is profitable or
because investors find their technology promising. In this second case,
the subsidy partially offsets private-sector investments that would
have been made without the subsidy, and taxpayer dollars pad the
company’s bottom line.
Government support that targets one industry or technology
over another encourages technological stagnation. A special
endorsement from the government gives one technology an unfair
price advantage over other technologies, which reduces competition.
Further, subsidies reduce the incentive for an industry to make their
technology cost-competitive by encouraging dependence on
preferential treatment provided by the government.
The wind PTC is a perfect example of a technology’s continued
dependence on subsidies. Although the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) set a clear end date for the wind
PTC of December 31, 2012, the entire industry lobbied and
8
successfully pushed through an extension. In an April 2013 column in
The Wall Street Journal, Patrick Jenevein, CEO of the clean energy
firm Tang Energy Group, acknowledged the problems with his own
9
industry’s dependence on subsidies. Specifically, Jenevein stated,
“Government subsidies to new wind farms have only made the
industry less focused on reducing costs. In turn, the industry produces
a product that isn’t as efficient or cheap as it might be if we focused
less on working the political system and more on research and
10
development.”
This is no special vice of the wind industry—the same has been
true of the ethanol industry and many other industries, which have
also benefited from favorable treatment by the government.
When the 2004 Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit was set to
expire at the end of 2010, Congress extended the credit by another

8. Raju Chebium, Wind Energy Has Small Slice of Energy Pie butBig Lobbying Push for
Tax Credit, COLORADOAN.COM (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20121207/
NEWS01/312070013/Wind-energy-has-small-slice-energy-pie-big-lobbying-push-tax-credit.
9. Patrick Jenevein, Wind-Power Subsidies? No Thanks., WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2013, at
A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323501004578386501479255158
.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop.
10. Id.
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11

year after the corn lobby pushed hard for an extension. Although
the credit expired at the beginning of 2012, the corn lobby pushed and
12
obtained tax credits for fueling infrastructure and advanced biofuels.
These special tax breaks benefit an industry that already has a
guaranteed share of the fuel market. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
and the Energy Independence and Security Act extended a
Renewable Fuel Standard that requires the United States to blend
13
thirty-six billion gallons of ethanol into gasoline by 2022. The
industry’s continual clinging to taxpayer-funded handouts is a result
of receiving the initial tax credit, as evidenced by the boom and bust
of the wind industry when the tax credit expired and then was
14
reinstated. Special carve-outs encourage industry complacency and
dependence on government support.
Another destructive feature of subsidies is that they allow the
federal government to direct the flow of private-sector investments.
Direct expenditures, targeted tax breaks, loan guarantees, and other
government subsidies allocate resources away from more competitive
projects. For example, if the government gives a tax credit to banana
producers only, it shifts labor and capital towards banana production
and away from other economic activities, like strawberry or grape
production.
In effect, by politically picking winners, subsidies crowd out
investment and make it difficult for new technologies that do not
15
receive a government handout to enter the market. The market, and
not politicians in Washington, is well-suited for determining how to
allocate resources to meet consumer demand. When a firm minimizes
costs, the firm maximizes profit by maximizing value to the consumer.
Subsidies significantly distort that process.

11. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
H.R. 4853, 111th Cong. § 708(d) (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/
hr4853.
12. Kirsten Korosec, Why the Anti-Tax Lobby Saved Corn Ethanol—For Now,
CBSNEWS.COM (June 15, 2011, 7:53 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_16243045595/why-the-anti-tax-lobby-saved-corn-ethanol—for-now/.
13. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, 121
Stat. 1492 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
14. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5.
15. See Chung-Lei Yang, Rent Seeking, Technology Commitment, and Economic
Development, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 640, 653–55 (1998) (discussing
market inefficiencies resulting from subsidies).
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Subsidies also make for poor economic policy because they
politicize the economic process by allowing the federal government to
highly influence decisions and investments. Industries that stand to
benefit from subsidies concentrate more effort into lobbying for the
subsidies and for preventing competitors from receiving similar
handouts. Banana producers push for tax-credit extensions; in
response, apple producers complain that they are at a disadvantage
and lobby for their own handouts.
Companies and politicians both stand to profit from this perverse
system. Taxpayer-funded subsidies create a system of cronyism
between government and industry. The process can be (albeit
simplistically) described as playing out in roughly three steps. First,
Industry X hires lobbyists to meet with Congressman Smith and tell
him that if he moves the subsidy legislation into law, Industry X will
build the plant in Congressman Smith’s district. Second, Congressman
Smith says to his constituents and his state that his hard efforts
brought jobs and economic growth, which certainly cannot hurt come
re-election time. It also does not hurt that Industry X is contributing
to Congressman Smith’s campaign. Third, Congressman Smith wins
re-election, and both he and Industry X clamor that the subsidy’s
expiration will hurt the local economy because Industry X will face
layoffs. This process typically results in Industry X securing an
extension of the subsidy and Congressman Smith holding onto his
seat in Congress.
This tendency of the political process to continually pick winners
16
and losers was first identified by economist Gordon Tullock and
17
later defined by economist Anne Krueger as “rent-seeking.” Its
greatest costs result from distorting economic activity. The resources
a banana producer used for lobbying for banana tariffs or an
extension of the banana tax credit could have been spent actually
growing and selling bananas. Rather than engaging in profit-seeking
behavior in the marketplace, the producer is engaging in rent-seeking
behavior in the political process. Thus, the more the government
becomes involved in making economic decisions that are best left to
the private sector, the higher the perverse incentive to lobby. While
this does create a few lobbyist jobs, much consumer value is lost.

16. See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5
W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
17. Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
291 (1974).
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Economist Russell Sobel of West Virginia University defines
18
rent-seeking as unproductive entrepreneurship. Political efforts
made by rent-seeking companies could have been channeled toward
19
productive uses instead of distorting economic activity. Sobel found
that states that provide more political preferences have higher levels
of unproductive entrepreneurship and lower levels of productive
20
entrepreneurship, and therefore have slower economic growth.
Conversely, reducing government control of the energy economy
reduces the incentive to use the political process for gain. While rentseeking activity occurs in many sectors of the economy, the debate
over the wind PTC extension provides an excellent example.
Although clamoring from the wind industry for an extension of the
21
subsidy occurred for all of 2012 until Congress passed an extension,
it is important to put much of this clamoring into context for future
debates on energy subsidies.
III. REFUTING COMMON CLAIMS FOR JUSTIFICATION OF THE WIND
PTC
Advocates for extending the wind PTC often argue that without
an extension, the industry will lose jobs, America will move further
away from energy diversity and towards dependence on foreign oil,
22
and the planet will continue to warm. However, such arguments are
narrow and short-sighted, ignoring economic, energy-supply, and
global-climate realities.
A. The Only Jobs Lost Are Those Propped Up by the Taxpayer
An enticing and attractive argument for the wind industry to
make, especially in a recessionary economic environment, is that jobs
will be lost with the subsidy’s expiration. This argument, however,
could apply to just about any sector of the economy. Take VHS or
videotape producers, for example. Imagine the VHS industry writing
this letter to Congress:
VHS has been a staple of the American way of watching television
and movies. VHS has supported countless manufacturing jobs, and
even though there are better products out there, let’s face it: we

18. Russell Sobel, Testing Baumol: Institutional Quality and the Productivity of
Entrepreneurship, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 641, 646 (2008).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 648.
21. Chebium, supra note 8.
22. See, e.g., AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5.
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need a variety of ways to watch our programs. The states and local
economies that have VHS production facilities have experienced
and benefited from VHS production, but without a little help from
the taxpayers, jobs will be lost and the industry will atrophy. VHS
production has bipartisan support, will be good for American
manufacturing jobs, and will diversify our program-watching
ability. America needs VHS, and VHS needs the taxpayers’ help.

Windmills are no different than VHS tapes. The argument that,
without extending the PTC, domestic energy production and
American jobs will be lost is an equally flawed line of economic
reasoning. The history of the wind PTC makes this point clear.
Congress first passed the PTC in 1992 but allowed it to expire several
23
times. The PTC expired in 2000, 2002, and 2004, and annual wind
installation decreased by 93 percent, 73 percent, and 77 percent,
24
respectively. Wind energy advocates call this a boom-and-bust cycle
25
created by unstable policy, but it is more likely a case of the wind
PTC’s oversupplying a market and artificially propping up a large
portion of wind production. Predictably, in response to the looming
expiration date, extending the wind PTC had bipartisan support. In
fact, two Republican governors sent a letter similar to the
hypothetical VHS letter to the House of Representatives and the
26
Senate, urging them to pass the wind PTC extension.
The Republican governors’ letter cites a study by the economic
consulting firm Navigant that estimates nearly half the wind jobs will
27
be lost if Congress fails to act. With enough taxpayer dollars,
America can prop up just about any industry, even VHS, but that
does not mean those jobs are adding value and growing the economy.
If Navigant’s numbers are accurate, they indicate that the PTC
subsidy has shifted labor and capital away from other, more
28
productive sectors of the economy and towards wind. Moreover, it
shows that the entire wind industry will not disappear with the PTC,

23. Renewable Energy Production Incentive, Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §
13317a (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13317 (West 2005)).
24. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5.
25. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT (2012), available at
http://awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC_April-2011.pdf.
26. Letter from Terry E. Brandstad, Governor, & Sam Brownback, Governor, to
Conference Committee Members (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/
pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=13871.
27. Id. (citing NAVIGANT CONSULTING INC., IMPACT OF THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT
ON THE U.S. WIND MARKET 24 (2011), available at http://www.awea.org/_cs_upload/learnabout/
publications/reports/12538_3.pdf).
28. See id. (showing increased wind jobs during period of PTC).
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indicating that some wind energy can compete in the electricity
market without subsidies. The sector of the wind industry that does
remain will be the healthier, robust part—the part that sells an
economically viable product without the subsidy.
B. We Are Not Running Out of Fossil Fuels and Even if We Were, So
What?
Another common justification for energy subsidies is that the
United States has a limited amount of fossil-fuel resources and that
domestically produced wind energy will put America on the track to
energy independence. This is a shortsighted and unconvincing
argument.
First, America has an abundance of domestic conventional-fuel
resources. Coal is the single largest electricity source in America; for
years, it is has been used for nearly half of all domestic electricity
29
generation. With 497 billion tons of recoverable domestic
resources—enough to provide electricity in North America for 500
years at current consumption rates—coal has the potential to be a
30
useful energy resource long into the future.
Further, natural gas is taking on more of a role in the energy
sector. North America has approximately 4.2 quadrillion (4244
trillion) cubic feet of recoverable natural gas, which would satisfy 175
31
years’ worth of consumption at current rates. The price of domestic
natural gas is currently so low that companies have largely stopped
drilling for dry-gas-only wells and instead are drilling where they can
32
find wet gas or a combination of oil and gas.
It is also useful to stress that these estimates are far from
definitive. The history of global oil reserves, for example, provides a
valuable lesson for believers of imminent resource exhaustion. Three
decades ago, proven oil reserves were 645 billion barrels; five years
ago, reserves were 1.28 trillion barrels; and in 2009, reserves increased

29. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRICITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states.
30. INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY INVENTORY 16–17
(2011), available at http://www.energyforamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/EnergyInventoryFINAL.pdf.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Mark Passwaters, Massive Shift to Liquids Under Way, But Analysts Say It May Not
Move Gas Prices, SNL FIN. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www2.snl.com/Interactivex/
article.aspx?CdId=A-14173382-12848.
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33

to 1.34 trillion barrels. Even as the world consumes more oil than
ever before, innovative technologies have helped discover and extract
more crude oil. Meanwhile, the technological one-two punch of
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has led to extraction of
new reserves, tapping into areas where oil and gas recovery was
34
previously thought to be uneconomical.
Simply because the United States has these resources underneath
its soil does not mean that they must be used. If another energy
source is more affordable, then coal and natural gas can stay in the
ground. If America were depleting its conventional fuels, it would be
good news for wind proponents. Decreasing supplies of fossil fuels
would drive up their price and make alternative power generation
more economical. Price signals would trigger investments in
competing technologies, and technologies that could provide lowercost electricity would capture more of the market.
Additionally, there are competing uses for electricity-generating
resources. For instance, not only does natural gas provide over thirty
percent of America’s electricity generation, but it also serves as
feedstock for fertilizers, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, and is used
for waste treatment, food processing, fueling industrial boilers, and
35
much more. There is a profound complexity in producers’
preference for selling their resources to those who are willing to pay
more because they value the resource more. That complexity should
not be manipulated or distorted by politicians; the market is a much
better arbiter of how resources are best allocated.
Importantly, the demand for electricity is, for the most part,
stable. Although businesses and consumers may use less electricity
36
during a recession, overall demand persists. The global market for
37
electricity is a multi-trillion dollar market that continues to grow.

33. Energy Solutions for America–The Heritage Foundation, THE LIBRE INITIATIVE,
http://www.thelibreinitiative.com/public/energy-solutions-for-america-the-heritage-foundation373.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
34. Scott Tong, The Oil Man Who Figured Out Fracking, MARKETPLACE (Dec. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/oil-man-who-figured-out-fracking.
35. Uses in Industry, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/uses_
industry.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
36. NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., 2009 SUMMER RELIABILITY
ASSESSMENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/summer2009.pdf.
37. See FATIH BIROL, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, POWER TO THE PEOPLE: THE
WORLD OUTLOOK FOR ELECTRICITY INVESTMENT (2004), available at http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull461/power_to_the_people.html (explaining that world
electricity demand is projected to double between 2000 and 2030).
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The resource that can provide the most value to the consumer will
certainly have its place in it.
C. The Futility of Politicized Energy Independence
Eliminating American dependence on foreign oil—making the
United States “energy independent”—is a popular notion that
politicians on both sides of the aisle love to invoke. Yet, campaigning
for more renewable energy such as wind and solar to replace foreign
oil is a non sequitur. Wind and solar energy are used for electricity
generation. Since oil generates less than one percent of America’s
38
electricity, it is misleading to suggest that wind and solar generation
would affect oil consumption.
U.S. electricity is largely supplied by domestic sources, and those
energy resources that the United States does import come from a
diversity of suppliers, many of which are friendly allies. In 2011, 42
percent of U.S. electricity generation came from coal, 19 percent from
nuclear, 25 percent from natural gas, and 13 percent from renewable
39
sources, the majority of which come from hydroelectric power. Most
of the coal that the United States does import (only one percent of
40
total consumption) comes from Colombia, and 90 percent of the
imported natural gas comes from Canada, with much of the rest
41
coming from Trinidad. Out of the 2,472 billion cubic feet of natural
gas consumed in December 2012 in the United States, only 3.7
42
percent came from net imports. The United States also imports most
43
of its uranium from Canada and Australia. Oil is a different story.
The country’s three single biggest oil suppliers are Canada, Saudi
44
Arabia, and Mexico.

38. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HOW MUCH OF OUR ELECTRICITY IS GENERATED
RENEWABLE ENERGY? (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/
renewable_electricity.cfm.
39. Id.
40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COAL EXPLAINED, COAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
(2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_imports.
41. Id.; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS IMPORTS BY COUNTRY (2012),
available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_m.htm.
42. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS: MONTHLY SUPPLY AND
DISPOSITION BALANCE (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_sum_sndm_
s1_m.htm.
43. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., URANIUM MARKETING ANNUAL REPORT (2012),
available at http://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/.
44. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS: WEEKLY
PRELIMINARY CRUDE IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (2013), available at
hhttp://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_wimpc_s1_w.htm.
FROM
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Nevertheless, energy independence is not an appropriate policy
goal. Oil is a global commodity, and whether the United States is a
net importer or net exporter has little bearing on insulating
Americans from price volatility. For comparison, even though the
United States is self-sufficient in food production, domestic prices are
45
affected by supply problems in other parts of the world.
Energy independence makes for a catchy sound-bite, but it
should not be the goal of energy policy. The biggest threat to
America’s reliable and affordable energy comes in the form of
domestic government interventions that artificially raise or lower
prices and distort market investments through unnecessary
regulations, subsidies, preferential tax treatment, and other marketdistorting policies.
America’s largely market-based energy policies have historically
46
provided the nation with abundant and affordable energy resources.
When prices have spiked, government solutions more often than not
made things worse. Unfortunately, an upward trajectory of
government intervention through regulations, subsidies, mandates,
and protections is threatening previous success. Americans will
continue to be best served by energy markets that are free,
competitive, and open. Ensuring that such energy markets are free,
competitive, and open should be the main focus of American energy
policy.
D. No Impact on Climate Change
If the United States has a robust, diverse energy supply, why
subsidize a number of energy technologies? One ostensible reason is
to reduce the nation’s carbon footprint. Reducing global warming is
much of the motivation behind subsidizing carbon-free sources of
energy or establishing a price on greenhouse-gas emissions, either by
means of a carbon tax or through a cap-and-trade system that creates
a cap on greenhouse-gas emissions and allows emitters to sell permits
47
they accumulate if they are under the cap.
45. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL
SUPPLY AND DEMAND: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RECENT INCREASE IN FOOD
COMMODITY PRICES 5 (2008), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/pdfs/
global_agricultural_supply_and_demand.pdf.
46. See The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/
regulation/history.asp (last visited April 9, 2013) (deregulating natural gas and ending federal
price controls helped encourage economic development).
47. What is EPA Doing About Climate Change?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities.html (last updated Apr. 22, 2013).
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However, the problem with discussing climate change begins
with the way politicians and the media on both sides of the aisle talk
about the issue and sensationalize it to energize and motivate their
respective supporters. Arguments that human activity has nothing to
do with climate change or that the planet is experiencing catastrophic
warming are neither truthful nor useful to the debate.
But not long ago, scientists thought that global cooling was a
threat to the planet. As recently as 1975, Newsweek ran an article
48
titled, “The Cooling World.” Some proposals mentioned by
climatologists in the Newsweek article included covering the polar ice
49
caps with black soot to melt them.
Almost all climatologists and respected scientists in the climatechange community agree that carbon dioxide (CO2) and other
50
greenhouse gases are warming agents. That agreement, however,
does not come close to settling the scientific debate about the
magnitude of climate change, the driving forces behind climate
change, and the amount of warming projected from increased
greenhouse-gas emissions. For instance, Harvard astrophysicist, Sallie
Baliunus, and astronomer, Willie Soon, identify solar activity as the
51
driving force behind climate change. Richard Lindzen, professor of
meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes that
mainstream climate models fail to take into account naturally
occurring cycles such as El Niño, the Pacific decadal oscillation, or the
52
Atlantic multidecadal oscillation.
Nor does this general agreement that greenhouse gases are a
warming agent tell us how much increasing greenhouse-gas emissions
will contribute to sea-level rise. Even the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change’s projection of sea-level rise over the next century is

48. Peter Gwynne, The Cooling World, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1975, at 64.
49. Id. (“[Scientists] concede that some of the more spectacular solutions proposed, such
as melting the arctic ice cap by covering it with black soot or diverting arctic rivers, might create
problems far greater than those they solve.”)
50. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: TECHNICAL SUMMARY 21 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf.
51. SALLIE BALIUNAS & WILLIE SOON, CLIMATE HISTORY AND THE SUN 11 (2001).
52. Richard S. Lindzen, Op-Ed, The Climate Science Isn’t Settled, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30,
2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703939404574567423917025
400.html.
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a modest seven to twenty-three inches, with the lower end of that
53
projection more likely to occur by the end of the century.
Moreover, universal agreement that CO2 is a warming agent does
not imply that the United States or the entire planet is going to
experience more extreme droughts, heat waves, or other natural
disasters. University of Alabama climatologist John Christy’s recent
testimony on this issue emphasizes that climate extremes, like the
recent drought, will continue to occur with or without anthropogenic
54
warming.
When discussing CO2, it is important to first remember that CO2
is a colorless, odorless gas that does not have direct adverse health
55
effects unless inhaled at extremely high concentrations. In other
words, unlike black carbon or soot, it is a misnomer to label CO2 as a
pollutant. Policymakers typically only discuss the social cost of CO2.
They hardly ever discuss whether more CO2 in the atmosphere could
also create a positive externality or whether the benefits from living
in a warmer world could outweigh the costs of CO2 as a negative
externality. A plethora of peer-reviewed literature explains that there
are benefits from more CO2 in our atmosphere, such as plant growth,
human longevity, seed enrichment, and decreased soil erosion as a
56
result of more robust tree root growth.
If the scientific community unanimously agreed that the Earth is
warming at an unsustainable rate, policymakers and climatologists
would need to act quickly and thoughtfully together. Yet the current
proposed and implemented solutions, whether they involve building
more wind turbines with renewable-energy subsidies, biofuel
53. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 13–14 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.
54. The American Energy Initiative: A Focus on H.R. 6172: Hearing on H.R. 6172 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Energy & Power, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of John R. Christy,
Professor of Atmospheric Science, The University of Alabama in Huntsville), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/E
P/20120920/HHRG-112-IF03-WState-ChristyJ-20120920.pdf.
55. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DOCUMENTATION FOR IMMEDIATELY
DANGEROUS TO LIFE OR HEALTH CONCENTRATIONS (IDLHS) (1994), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/124389.html.
56. See, e.g., Enhanced or Impaired?, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF CARBON DIOXIDE &
GLOBAL CHANGE, http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/health/ch3.php (last visited
Feb. 4, 2013) (discussing CO2’s positive effect on food quantity and quality); SCI. & PUB. POLICY
INST., THE MANY BENEFITS OF ATMOSPHERIC CO2 ENRICHMENT (2011), available at
http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/images/stories/papers/other/55_benefits_of_co2_pamphlet.pdf
(discussing CO2’s positive effect on air pollution, food production, biodiversity, and other
issues).
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mandates, cap-and-trade systems, or carbon taxes, will have a
negligible impact on the climate while imposing certain significant
costs on quality of life and the economy.
E. Unilateral Emissions Reductions Fail To Reduce Global Warming
Some countries’ unilateral reduction of their greenhouse-gas
emissions will do next to nothing to reduce global temperatures. So,
whether one believes that the Earth is headed toward climate
catastrophe or that the Earth is gradually warming, there is nearly
universal agreement that an all-out carbon-cutting policy in the
57
United States would do very little to moderate global warming.
Even if the United States were to curb carbon emissions eighty-three
percent below 2005 levels by 2050 (what cap-and-trade legislation
called for), it would only reduce global temperatures by two-tenths of
58
a degree Celsius by the close of the century. Subsidizing wind
production with the PTC and other carbon-free sources of energy
would have even less of an effect, as those policies would not be
enough to reach the U.S. cap-and-trade emissions target.
However, a common argument for unilateral reduction of
greenhouse-gas emissions is that if the United States leads, the rest of
the world will follow. Although future CO2 emissions will likely come
overwhelmingly from the developing world, these countries show
little appetite for squeezing economic growth for uncertain climate
59
outcomes. Despite actions taken by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate CO2 emissions in the United States, the
developing world has yet to follow suit and it plans for massive
60
expansion of coal consumption. China surpassed the United States
61
as the largest CO2 emitter in 2006. By 2009 (the most recent year for
57. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works, Jackson Confirms EPA
Chart Showing No Effect on Climate Without China, India (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.PressReleases&ContentRec
ord_id=564ed42f-802a-23ad-4570-3399477b1393.
58. Chip Knappenberger, Climate Impacts of Waxman-Markey (Part II), MASTER RES.
(May 7, 2009), http://www.masterresource.org/2009/05/part-ii-a-climate-analysis-of-the-waxmanmarkey-climate-bill%e2%80%94what-if-the-world-played-along.
59. Alex Morales & Kim Chipman, China, EU Comments Show Reduced Scope of UN
Climate Talks, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1128/china-joins-eu-to-scale-back-outlook-for-un-climate-talks.html.
60. Ailun Yang & Yiyum Cui, Global Coal Risk Assessment: Data Analysis and Market
Research 7–9 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, Nov. 2012), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/global_coal_risk_assessment.pdf.
61. China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html?_r=0.
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which information is available), China’s emissions were forty-five
62
percent higher than America’s. Other developing countries are also
rapidly increasing their emissions as they develop their economies
and expand their power base. According to a recent report from the
World Resources Institute, 59 different countries plan to build nearly
63
1200 coal-fired power plants, totaling over 1.4 million megawatts.
64
China and India alone account for 76 percent of the proposals.
Developing countries not only want access to cheap, reliable
electricity, but they also have other, more urgent concerns than global
warming. It is simply naïve to assume that these countries will follow
the United States’ lead and curb economic growth to reduce
greenhouse-gas emissions. Demanding CO2 emissions reductions
from developing countries is immoral, and developing countries have
much more pressing environmental concerns that should rightly take
priority, such as gaining access to clean air and clean drinking water.
China has a serious smog problem that is not a result of CO2 and is
65
now even affecting Japan. Nearly thirty-eight million Indians suffer
66
from a water-borne disease annually. Furthermore, millions of
people in these countries are without electricity, and yet the West
wants them to curb their energy use or demands that they build
67
expensive, intermittent energy capacity. In July of 2012, India made
headlines for the largest blackout in history, which left over 300
68
million without electricity. Initial reports suggested that the blackout
affected over 600 million people but omitted one key fact: many of
69
India’s residents never had access to electricity in the first place.
62. See Millennium Development Goals Indicators, UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIV.,
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749 (last updated July 2, 2012).
63. Yang & Cui, supra note 60, at 5.
64. Id.
65. See Suffocating Smog from China Reaches Regions of Japan, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 5,
2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/02/05/2003554261 (discussing air
pollution’s carry-over effect on Japan).
66. INDIRA KHURANA & ROMIT SEN, WATERAID, DRINKING WATER QUALITY IN RURAL
INDIA: ISSUES AND APPROACHES 4 (2009), available at http://www.wateraid.org/~/media/
Publications/drinking-water-quality-rural-india.pdf.
67. See DAVID JACOBS ET AL., WORLD FUTURE COUNCIL, UNLEASHING RENEWABLE
ENERGY
POWER
IN
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
5
(2009),
available
at
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/_Media/REPfund_DEC_09.pdf
(explaining how difficult it is to get financing for renewable energy technologies in developing
countries because of the very small profit margins).
68. Tripti Lahiri, How Many People Actually Lost Power?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 5:06
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/08/01/how-many-people-actually-lost-power-inindia.
69. Id.
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These countries are not going to restrict their energy use to reduce
greenhouse-gas emissions when they are still struggling towards
providing the basic amenities of modern life for their people. Nor
should they.
F. The Seen and the Unseen Market Distortions
Proponents of the wind PTC only take into account the visible
effects of this policy. They highlight the jobs of manufacturers
70
assembling windmills and pouring cement for the platforms. They
emphasize the increasing role of wind in America’s electricity
71
portfolio which reduces the amount of coal America burns. What
proponents routinely ignore is the fact that the billions of dollars
provided in subsidies do not fall freely from the sky; the federal
government either borrows money from the American public or taxes
the American public to pay for the subsidies. Simply put, taxpayerfunded programs do not create jobs; they shift them from one sector
of the economy to another. The opportunity costs, or the unseen
effects of government spending, are the lost labor and capital
extracted from other sectors of the economy to artificially support the
72
politically preferred ones. In this case, the people and components
needed to sell wind electricity cannot simultaneously be used to build
automobiles, washing machines, or sidewalks. By distorting economic
activity, wind subsidies are actually a net drain on the economy.
One common claim touted by wind lobbyists is that wind energy
creates more jobs per kilowatt hour than do conventional sources of
73
energy. By that reasoning, we could replace all of the world’s
mechanized agriculture equipment and give farmers shovels, hoes,
and picks. That would certainly create jobs, but it would also
significantly reduce productivity. If we can produce more energy with
less labor, that frees up human resources to be productive elsewhere
in the economy.
French economist Frédéric Bastiat often discussed the seen and
unseen effects of decisions in the marketplace. In an 1850 essay,
Bastiat wrote:

70. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5 (emphasizing the jobs that are created or
saved by the wind PTC).
71. Wind Works, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/windworks/ (last visited Apr. 9,
2013).
72. See supra Part II.
73. Electricity from the Wind . . . Economic Development for Rural Communities, NEB.
ENERGY Q. (Apr. 2004), http://www.neo.ne.gov/neq_online/april2004/apr2004.01.htm.
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In the department of economy, an act, a habit, an institution, a law,
gives birth not only to an effect, but to a series of effects. Of these
effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself simultaneously
with its cause—it is seen. The others unfold in succession—they are
not seen: it is well for us, if they are foreseen. Between a good and a
bad economist this constitutes the whole difference—the one takes
account of the visible effect; the other takes account both of the
effects which are seen, and also of those which it is necessary to
74
foresee.

The wind PTC has had both seen and unseen effects on the economy.
Unfortunately, too many people have not noticed the unseen effects.
Wind subsidies impose a number of costs on the economy. Not
only do the subsidies have direct costs in terms of billions of spent
75
taxpayer dollars, but the PTC has distorting effects on the wholesale
electricity market. Setting aside the fact that wind fails to be prevalent
when electricity demand is most needed (when was the last time the
76
wind was blowing consistently hard during a heat wave?), wind
producers can actually bid to sell their energy for less than what it
costs to produce and still earn a profit because the PTC is so
77
generous. In effect, wind producers can bid negatively to supply
their power because of the subsidy.
Power producers compete against one another to sell electricity
to the grid. When selling electricity to grid operators, wind suppliers
can underbid other electricity producers in times of excess supply, pay
utilities to take their power, and still collect the $22 per megawatt
78
hour generated from the tax credit. This is a perfect example of rentseeking, in which the rent is so profitable that it makes more sense for
wind producers to lobby for the subsidy rather than attempt to sell
their product for earned profit.

74. FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen, in THE
BASTIAT COLLECTION 1 (Ludwig von Mises Inst. ed., 2007), available at
https://mises.org/books/bastiat1.pdf.
75. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE
CHAIRMAN’S MARK AS MODIFIED TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE “FAMILY AND BUSINESS TAX
CUT CERTAINTY ACT OF 2012,” SCHEDULED FOR MARK UP BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE ON AUG. 2, 2012, JCX-70-12 (Comm. Print 2012), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JCX.pdf.
76. See Jonathan A. Lesser, Wind Intermittency and the Production Tax Credit: A High
Cost Subsidy for Low Value Power, CONT’L ECON. at EX-1 (Oct. 2012),
http://www.continentalecon.com/publications/cebp/Lesser_PTC_Report_Final_October2012.pdf (“In all three regions, over 84% of the installed wind generation infrastructure fails to
produce electricity when electric demand is greatest.”).
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id.

Loris (Do Not Delete)

340

5/19/2013 10:44 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. XXIII:323

Although wind companies selling their power more cheaply to
the grid sounds attractive to electricity consumers, these sales have
short- and long-term adverse implications on the electricity market.
In the short run, integrating an intermittent, low-value source, such as
wind, into the power grid in place of a more reliable energy source
makes life difficult for grid operators who are constantly trying to
79
balance supply and demand. To compensate for the irregularity and
uncertainty of wind-powered electricity, wholesale operators must
increase the amount of readily available backup power from
80
conventional sources. The operational costs are spread among the
81
ratepayers.
If wind generation were competitive in the marketplace without
subsidies, then the market would adjust to wind energy’s particular
operating conditions. Wind’s intermittency and the fact that more
wind production may displace other types of electricity generation are
not reasons to prevent the construction of wind turbines. The cause
for concern is instead the government’s intervention into electricity
generation, which inevitably causes market distortions. If, after
accounting for all the costs (such as backup generation and the
transmission lines necessary to bring wind energy from remote
locations to where the power is needed), wind is price competitive,
then it will have its place in the electricity sector.
A good or service belongs in the marketplace when the value of
the output is greater than the value of the input and when the output
satisfies a consumer need. Subsidies reverse this by artificially
reducing the costs of inputs to make the output value of wind more
competitive, thus disguising the real cost and value of wind. If
ratepayers value and demand wind energy, and if enough ratepayers
are willing to pay a premium for that electricity, then the market will
respond and provide it. Or, if the cost of wind technology decreases
and the price of conventional energy increases, more wind electricity
may enter the energy sector. The signals of profits and losses
determine what adds economic value and should determine the
extent of wind’s role in our country’s energy mix.

79. See id. at Ex-2, Ex-3 (explaining how wind blows the least when electricity is needed
most in the summer and how the most efficient energy resources produce electricity when they
are called on).
80. Id. at 18–19.
81. Id.
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IV. THE PATH FORWARD TO REMOVING MARKET DISTORTIONS
The debate over the wind PTC extension provides a timely look
into the economically destructive nature of energy subsidies. Energy
subsidies extend far beyond the wind PTC. Coal, natural gas, oil, and
renewable energy sources all enjoy preferential treatment at the
taxpayer’s expense. Congress should make it a priority to prevent any
new subsidization of energy sources and technologies. Congress
should also peel back the subsidies that are currently in place. Forcing
sunsets on preferential tax credits and offsetting the tax increases with
lower tax rates for all businesses (such as a lower corporate income
tax rate) would improve the tax code and lead to better energy policy.
A. Prevent and Remove Direct Spending
Direct energy expenditures in the United States have grown,
largely because of the over $40 billion awarded to the Department of
82
Energy (DOE) from the ARRA, also known as the stimulus bill. Of
that amount, $16.8 billion went to the Office of Energy Efficiency and
83
Renewable Energy. Additionally, the DOE spends billions of dollars
to fund applied-research programs through its yearly budget process.
Another DOE program that the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) lists as a direct expenditure is the Low Income Home Energy
84
Assistance Program (LIHEAP). To prevent more direct government
market distortions in the energy sector and to thus prevent wasting
taxpayer dollars, Congress should prohibit funding for new subsidies,
eliminate government programs that commercialize technologies, and
eliminate federal programs for low-income energy assistance.
1. Prohibit any new funding
Congress should ensure that no taxpayer dollars go directly to
energy production, storage, efficiency, infrastructure, or
transportation for non-government consumers. While these types of
projects may be important, they are better financed through the

82. Agency Profile: Department of Energy, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/
Transparency/RecoveryData/Pages/AgencyProfile.aspx?agency_code=89 (last visited Mar. 25,
2013).
83. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Allots $16.8 Billion for EERE, U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY (Feb. 17, 2009), http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/daily.cfm/hp_news_id=156.
84. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DIRECT FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND
SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR 2010 25–26 (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/
analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf.
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private sector, which is better positioned to make efficient
investments that meet consumers’ needs.
2. Eliminate
technologies

government

programs

to

commercialize

The DOE has spent billions of research dollars to reduce CO2.
Research dollars have gone towards energy-efficiency technologies,
renewable energy sources, carbon capture and sequestration, clean85
coal technologies, nuclear energy, and alternative-energy vehicles.
All of these energy sources and technologies are available today, but
they are not economical, whether due to burdensome regulations or
simply because they are still prohibitively expensive. It is not the
government’s role to force these technologies into the marketplace;
thus, Congress should eliminate all DOE-funded commercial
activities and focus on removing the onerous regulatory barriers that
86
prevent energy technologies from reaching the market. Congress
should focus on creating a more efficient system in which the private
sector can use government resources, such as national laboratories.
Congress should also create a structure that ensures government
research meets national objectives, and is accessible to the private
sector for application to economically viable endeavors.
3. Eliminate LIHEAP
LIHEAP is meant to help low-income households with energy
87
costs, energy crises, and home weatherization, but it has rapidly
expanded, is duplicative, and has been riddled with fraud and abuse.
A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that
the Department of Health and Human Services distributed funds to
thousands of deceased and incarcerated people and claimed that
LIHEAP application processors awarded funds to GAO officials
88
using fake addresses and fake energy bills. Eliminating LIHEAP
certainly does not mean that there will be no money to help lowincome households pay for energy costs. The federal government runs
85. Nicolas Loris, Department of Energy Budget Cuts: Time To End the Hidden Green
Stimulus, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2012/03/department-of-energy-budget-cuts-time-to-end-the-hidden-green-stimulus.
86. Id.
87. About LIHEAP, OFFICE OF CMTY. SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/programs/liheap/about (last visited April 9, 2013).
88. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-621, LOW-INCOME HOME ENERGY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: GREATER FRAUD PREVENTION CONTROLS ARE NEEDED 5–6 (2010),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10621.pdf.
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more than seventy means-tested aid programs that provide cash for
89
food, housing, medical care, and social services. Total federal and
state spending on means-tested assistance to low-income persons
90
exceeded $900 billion in 2011. Furthermore, cash, food, housing, and
energy aid are highly fungible when they reach the household level,
so households are in the best position to determine which good they
need most. Congress should eliminate LIHEAP funding entirely.
B. Tax Credits
By uniquely favoring one industry, special tax treatment can
serve the same purpose as a subsidy, and it has been an increasingly
attractive way for the government to award preferential treatment to
certain energy industries. The number of energy tax programs
expanded from eleven in 1999 to thirty-eight in President George W.
91
Bush’s 2007 budget. According to the EIA, tax expenditures
92
comprise almost two-thirds of electricity subsidies. Ideally, Congress
should immediately remove all distortionary energy tax policy—
meaning any tax policy that singles out an industry—and offset those
repeals with a broad tax cut. In order to wean industries off
preferential treatment and to not pull the rug out from companies
that built their business around the expectation of receiving a tax
credit, Congress should create a three-year window for expiration of
all energy tax expenditures. This should not include broadly available
93
tax deductions that apply across multiple sectors. Congress should
not provide new targeted tax credits, should not extend sun-setting
credits, should shorten the timeframe for which all targeted tax

89. Katherine Bradley & Robert Rector, Confronting the Unsustainable Growth of Welfare
Entitlements: Principles of Reform and Next Steps, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (June 24, 2010),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/confronting-the-unsustainable-growth-ofwelfare-entitlements-principles-of-reform-and-the-next-steps.
90. Id.
91. MOLLY SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41227, ENERGY TAX POLICY:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AND CURRENT STATUS OF ENERGY TAX EXPENDITURES 8–9
(2011).
92. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN
ENERGY MARKETS 2007 xi (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy2/
pdf/subsidy08.pdf.
93. For instance, some policymakers want to remove the manufacturer’s tax deduction for
the oil and gas industry under section 199 of the Internal Revenue Code, which applies to all
domestic manufacturers, including windmill and solar-panel manufacturers. For more
information, see Nicolas Loris & Curtis Dubay, What’s an Oil Subsidy, THE HERITAGE FOUND.
(May 12, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/whats-an-oil-subsidy.
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credits are available, and should broadly lower the corporate income
tax rate to prevent a tax increase.
1. No new tax credits
Congress should not implement any new tax credits for energy
production, energy infrastructure, transportation (production and
consumption), or energy-efficiency initiatives. This will prevent the
federal government from continuing to pick winners and losers, and it
will also ensure that Congress cannot use the tax code to direct
investments.
2. Force sun-setting tax credits to sunset
One of the larger problems with targeted tax credits is that upon
expiration, industry groups will lobby members of Congress to
expand the credits for another year, or for multiple years. Congress
should specify that any tax credit set to expire on December 31, 2013
cannot be extended and should be accompanied with an offsetting tax
reduction.
3. Expedite sunsetting
Congress should create a three-year window for all other tax
credits that extend over multiple years or do not expire, and it should
reduce the write-off percentage by one-third after each year. Any tax
credit tied to production should follow the same schedule. This time
frame will give industries a predictable window to lower costs and
adjust to competition without federal aid. Congress should then
reduce other taxes, such as the corporate income tax, by the amount
of revenue that expediting the elimination of these unsound policies
would raise.
C. Make Immediate Expensing Available for Everyone
Another way in which certain industries benefit over others
relates to how companies can expense capital costs. For instance, oil
and gas companies receive more generous treatment than other
94
industries through expensing of intangible drilling costs. A simple
solution is to allow all companies, including oil and gas companies, to
be able to expense their full capital costs immediately.

94. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BUSINESS EXPENSES FOR USE IN PREPARING 2012
RETURNS (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p535/ch07.html#en_US_2012_
publink1000208883 (outlining deduction procedures for intangible drilling costs).
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Immediate expensing allows companies to deduct the cost of
capital purchases at the time they occur rather than deducting the
95
costs over many years based on cumbersome depreciation schedules.
For instance, the Section 179 deduction in the Internal Revenue Code
96
allows for immediate expensing of eligible property. Immediate
expensing for all new plant and equipment costs—for any industry or
type of equipment—would allow newer equipment to come online
faster, which would improve energy efficiency and overall economic
efficiency.
D. Prevent and Remove Other Market Distortions
The government distorts the energy market in several other
ways—through loan guarantees, insurance programs, mandates,
tariffs on imported energy, and energy sales at below-market costs.
To eliminate these distortions, Congress should remove loan
guarantee programs, privatize public power administrations, and
restructure insurance for energy projects.
1. Prohibit any new loan guarantees or other capital subsidy
programs
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) included loan
guarantees for nuclear power, and section 1705 of the ARRA
amended EPAct to include loans for renewable energy, biofuel
projects, and electric power transmission systems that began
97
construction before October 1, 2011. Congress appropriated $6
98
billion for the credit subsidy costs of the section 1705 loans. A new
capital subsidy program gaining some traction in Congress is to create
a Clean Energy Deployment Administration within DOE, which
would act as a “green bank,” providing loans, loan guarantees, and
clean-energy-backed bonds to carbon-free technologies that

95. NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. BUS., SMALL BUSINESS TAX RATES AND TAX COMPLEXITY
(2013), available at http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/cribsheets/smallbusiness-tax-rates-cribsheet.pdf.
96. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ELECTING THE SECTION 179 DEDUCTION (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p946/ch02.html#en_US_2012_publink1000107394
(listing eligible property for deduction).
97. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
98. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY LOAN PROGRAM 2 (2011),
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/recovery/documents/Innovative__Technology_
Loan_Guarantee_Program.pdf.
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99

commercial lenders believe are too risky. But the DOE has no role
100
to play as a banker. By subsidizing a portion of the actual cost of a
project through a loan guarantee, the government is allocating
resources away from more-valued uses to less-valued uses. In essence,
these guarantees and loans direct labor and capital away from more
competitive projects. This reduces the incentive for the energy
investor or business to manage risk, innovate, and to increase
efficiency, and it crowds out other innovative energy projects that do
not receive loans. Venture capitalists are perfectly capable of making
these investments and reaping the rewards from risk or suffering the
losses from bad investments. Whether a company that receives a loan
guarantee is profitable or insolvent, the program is a failure of a
policy. No loan guarantee program should be expanded, nor should
the government implement any new capital subsidy programs.
2. Restructure public power
Federal utilities, known as Power Marketing Administrations
101
(PMAs), were set up to provide cheap electricity to rural areas.
PMAs can sell electricity at below-market rates because of favorable
financing terms—they receive federal tax exemptions and receive
102
loans at below-market interest rates. Construction, rehabilitation,
operation, and maintenance of PMAs are financed through the main
DOE budget, offset collections, alternative financing, and a
103
reimbursable agreement with the Bureau of Reclamation.
Furthermore, rural electric cooperatives (RECs) are private
organizations, in many cases non-profits, that provide about twelve
104
percent of the nation’s electricity sales. RECs receive special tax

99. Nicolas Loris & Jack Spencer, The Department of Energy Should Not Be the Green
Banker, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2011/10/the-department-of-energy-should-not-be-the-green-banker.
100. Id.
101. The DOE Power Marketing Administration is made up of the Southeastern Power
Administration, the Southwestern Power Administration, the Western Area Power
Administration, and Bonneville Power Administration. Department of Energy Offices. See
Offices, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/offices (last visited May 6, 2013) (listing the offices
of members of the Power Marketing Administration).
102. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FEDERAL ENERGY MARKET INTERVENTIONS 1999:
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION AND END USE 19, 22 (2000), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/
servicerpt/subsidy1/pdf/sroiaf%282000%2902.pdf.
103. Id. at 20.
104. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, CO-OP FACTS & FIGURES (2012), available at
http://www.nreca.coop/members/Co-opFacts/Documents/AnnualMeetingFactSheet.pdf.
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105

exemptions and low-interest loans from the government. Congress
should remove privileges for federal utilities, municipal power
companies, and electricity cooperatives and, ultimately, sell off PMAs
to private buyers.
3. Restructure insurance and risk mitigation
Several government programs offer liability-insurance schemes
for specific industries. While some of these programs may have been
justifiable in the past to protect private entities that engaged in highrisk operations in support of vital national interests, they now often
serve to subsidize insurance costs for private, profit-seeking
106
industries. Two examples are the $75 million liability cap for
offshore oil and gas operations and the Price-Anderson Act of 1957,
which provides a liability structure for the nuclear industry that
107
extends through 2025. Given the high probability of at least some
frivolous lawsuits in pursuit of unlimited damages, removing the cap
entirely without implementing a new system would subject covered
industries to punitively high costs. Instead, Congress should reform
liability caps, including reforming the Price-Anderson Act when it
expires, in a way that accurately assigns risk and liability to those
108
engaged in covered activities.
4. Eliminate production mandates
When the federal tax credit for blending ethanol into gasoline
and the fifty-four-cent-per-gallon tariff on imported ethanol expired,
a diverse group of fiscal watchdogs, environmentalists, and free-trade
109
proponents all hailed this as a major victory. Though this was a
move in the right direction, the real burden on consumers and the
environment is that producers will continue to blend ethanol into

105. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 84, at 22, 25.
106. Anthony Heyes, Determining the Price of Price-Anderson, 25 REGULATION 26, 30
(Winter 2002–03), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/
2002/10/v25n4-8.pdf.
107. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2006); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
108. For a comprehensive solution to offshore oil-spill liability, see Nicolas Loris, Jack
Spencer & James Carafano, Oil Spill Liability: A Plan for Reform, THE HERITAGE FOUND.
(Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/oil-spill-liability-a-plan-forreform.
109. Nicolas Loris, Two Cheers for Ethanol Subsidies Expiring—But Costly Mandate
Remains, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2012/01/ethanol-subsidies-expiring-but-the-costly-mandate-remains.
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gasoline—because they are federally required to do so. EPAct 2005
contained the first-ever requirement that renewable fuels be mixed
110
into the gasoline supply.
The 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA)
substantially increased the mandated amount of renewable fuel
required to be blended into transportation fuel to 36 billion gallons by
2022. EISA mandated that 250 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol be
blended into gasoline in 2011 and 500 million gallons be blended in
111
2012. Thus far, zero gallons have been produced, because no
companies have been able to produce commercially viable cellulosic
112
ethanol. As a result, refiners had to pay more than $6 million in
waiver credits or surcharges to comply with the EPA’s minimum
113
volume requirements. Undoubtedly, refiners then pass these costs
to the consumers. The EPA ratcheted down its goal for cellulosic
biofuel production in 2012 to 8.65 million gallons—less than 2 percent
114
of the original goal. The fact that cellulosic ethanol production is
nowhere near providing industrial-scale quantities of fuel
demonstrates the government’s inability to determine what is
commercially viable and beneficial for consumers.
V. THE CURIOUS TASK
Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek wrote in The Fatal Conceit
that “[t]he curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how
115
little they really know about what they imagine they can design.”
For far too long, politicians have unsuccessfully attempted to
demonstrate their ability to design and control the energy economy.
The direct consequences, the unintended consequences, and the
harmful effects on taxpayers, consumers, and the economy broadly
110. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
111. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, 121 Stat. 1492
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
112. Matthew Wald, A Fine for Not Using a Biofuel That Doesn’t Exist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/business/energy-environment/companies-face-finesfor-not-using-unavailable-biofuel.html?_r=0.
113. Fuels and Fuel Additives 2012 RFS2 Data, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/rfsdata/2012emts.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 2013); Jenny Mandel,
Refiners Protest EPA’s “Ridiculous” Cellulosic Targets, GREENWIRE (June 22, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/06/22/5.
114. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg.
1320, 1320–1358 (Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
115. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK 76
(W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988).
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should serve as a wake-up call to free the market from distortions
created by privileged treatment from the government. The discussion
over the wind PTC extension provides valuable context to the larger
energy-subsidy debate, and the same logic applied in this Article
applies not only to the energy sector but to most sectors of the
American economy. The task of preventing and removing subsidies
from the energy economy is extremely difficult, but it is necessary.

